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Democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa: Perspectives from 
Democracy Support 
 
PETER BURNELL 
 
ABSTRACT This article offers perspectives on the prospects for democratisation in the Middle East 
North Africa (MENA) region in the light of political developments since 2010, with particular reference 
to international democracy support. There are five main sections: first, an introduction shares certain 
assumptions about democracy support’s general record; second, threats and opportunities to 
democracy support arising from developments in the region; third, democracy support’s response to 
those developments; and fourth, some challenges for democracy support in the region and beyond. 
Throughout, discussion is contextualised within the larger literature on democratisation. Final remarks 
lead to the conclusion that developments in the region both present challenges that should be viewed 
as opportunities, and offer opportunities that will be challenging to address, not just for democracy 
support in the region and further afield but in terms of the guidance that democratisation studies have 
to offer.  
Introduction  
This article offers perspectives on events in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region since the 
start of the so-called ‘Arab spring’ with specific reference to international support for democratic 
development in the region and beyond. The idea of support includes diplomatic initiatives and 
technical assistance. Financial transfers to pro-democracy organisations and activities in a country 
may be a part but not necessarily the greater part. Several assumptions about international 
democracy support are made at the outset.  
First, the evolution of international support for democratisation over the last two decades has 
tended to be driven more by political change than to function as a determinant of political change. 
Moreover it has not always been successful either in terms of building better and sustained 
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democracy or in terms of realising the foreign policy motivations or goals that might be thought to lie 
behind it. For example, the leaning now shown by Iraq’s elected government towards Iran is not what 
the US intended when overthrowing Saddam’s regime. So the record is patchy, at best. 
Second, in so far as democracy support should be viewed as having an influence – either pro-
democratic or anti-democratic – on a country’s political trajectory, the way this works should be 
understood less as a wholly independent external variable acting upon a wholly dependent domestic 
variable, and instead more as an interactive process whereby both sides and sets of variables or 
partners are to some degree mutually constitutive. 
Third, international democracy support is a relatively minor or subordinate component of a 
much more complex international environment, other aspects of which can be - and usually are - far 
more consequential for the domestic politics. Most notable of these is the pursuit by international 
actors of (other) foreign policy objectives that may not (always) coincide with the cause of democracy 
support. This observation applies no less to the MENA region than other regions.  
Fourth, for some years international democracy support has been on the defensive due to 
well-known reasons that include a toxic association with the use of force to bring down governments 
(i.e. ‘regime change’) first in Afghanistan (2001) and then in Iraq (2003); more recently the dimming of 
the superior economic credentials once claimed for democracy, due to the profound financial 
mismanagement and structural economic problems that several established democracies including 
the US seem to be grappling with, not very successfully, right now.
i
 
Threats and Opportunities for Democracy Support  
Coming as they did on top of the situation described above, the dramatic events that started unfolding 
in the MENA region beginning December 2010 in Tunisia could be seen to threaten the global 
industry of international democracy support for the following reasons. 
First, the ‘spring’/awakening’/’revolution’ (these words will be used interchangeably)  -  or 
more correctly springs/awakenings/revolutions/ (for most commentators see specific origins and 
subsequent trajectories that are distinctive from one place to another) - are generally understood to 
have taken place without effective democracy support or in spite of it, and not because of it. Indeed, in 
respect of what might count as the international causes, greater efficacy might be attributed to the 
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radicalising effect of the damaging consequences that the global economic downturn inflicted on 
vulnerable groups in society, than to the efforts of democracy support.  A further view is that Arab 
societies took on responsibility for initiating political change precisely because they had lost 
confidence in outside help, believing that foreign powers were complicit in maintaining the political 
status quo. These interpretations of what lay behind the revolutions of course must raise 
uncomfortable questions about whether democracy support is really necessary or worse - detrimental 
to achieving democratic openings - let alone whether it can now help democratic advance move 
further forward. The West did not seem to identify or engage with the real agents of change, namely 
the street,but instead had relationships with Arab governments and elite civil society groups or 
associations, some of whom were largely co-opted by the regime, which was the easy option. 
Second, then, there are now even more awkward questions about whether democracy 
support should aim to engage much more with the popular level, not just in the MENA countries but 
elsewhere in the world where authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes are still in power, and, if the 
answer is yes, then how to do it.  A practical problem exists where the popular level is fragmented or 
poorly organised. The regimes can be expected to oppose and obstruct such engagement and may 
even threaten unwelcome diplomatic consequences. Such problems can be expected almost 
anywhere and not only in the most oppressive regimes. Even where engagement is feasible, the risk 
of endangering the domestic authenticity that belongs to local protest emanating from within and 
below is ever present. 
Third, the Arab spring immediately raised a concern – whether warranted or not, but certainly 
not yet resolved - that very tricky foreign policy challenges for the West could well now arise. 
Challenges arise not just where very messy processes of political change are accompanied by 
political instability and great political uncertainty in the short run. They can also exist where a stable 
new democracy does follow on, and in due course democratically elected governments show 
themselves to be more responsive to domestic sentiment on matters like external relations compared 
to their predecessors. Although in the past the political support of the West for the spread of 
democracy generally has drawn on the well-known democratic peace thesis(democracies do not 
make war on other democracies), democratisation would at least complicate the West’s pursuit of 
what it judges to be vital interests in the MENA region, not least in the US’s case its special 
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relationship with Israel .These challenges could have a chilling effect on the West’s willingness to try 
to provoke democratic change elsewhere. 
However, in contrast to the threats posed by events in region, the Arab awakening could also be 
interpreted as providing new opportunities for international support to democratisation, both there and 
elsewhere, for several reasons. 
First, the revolutions seriously dented the idea of exceptionalisms – the notion that certain 
peoples or cultures either do not value human dignity and many of the freedoms that are prized in the 
West or alternatively are not ready to experience them. They also challenge the notion that 
intermediate, hybrid, or semi-liberalised regimes that are not democracies can maintain a stable 
equilibrium almost indefinitely, which is a notion that looked to be gaining traction in some circles 
precisely as a result of what had seemed like the political stability of MENA countries. 
Second, following the Arab awakening there is a chance for democracy support to recoup 
legitimacy if it can respond appropriately to what are authentically home-grown pro-democratic 
initiatives that originated from below or from within these societies. This would be a far cry from being 
seen to parachute in on a country and impose change from outside. 
Third, because the genie of political change in the MENA region is now out of the bottle we 
might be persuaded that the West needs all the help it can get from democracy support as it goes 
about (re)formulating relations with the region. Foreign policy previously had either ignored 
democratic goals or trumped them with a higher near-term valuation placed on objectives such as 
national security, including for example combating international terrorism, restricting labour mobility 
into Europe and maintaining energy security. Now, however, a foreign policy option of reverting to the 
political status quo ante in these countries does not look credible,for the status quo ante has proven 
to be unsustainable.So in theory democracy support should be able to gain an ‘in’ to the very heart of 
foreign policy making that previously was out of reach, even if various competing objectives of foreign 
policy other than democracy will doubtless continue to exist and may still prevail wherea very major 
contradiction looks inevitable. 
Fourth, although in some places like Egypt now the country’s interest in being a partner for 
international democracy support is nowhere near as positive as it was in some other countries in the 
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past, most notably in transition countries of Central/Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, some new 
territories previously closed to democracy support are being opened up. Libya in the MENA region 
and Myanmar outside are examples. Another example eventually could be Syria:  if the UN gets 
involved in peace-building there as seems likely at some point, then the UN will pursue its preferred 
combination of aiming to build peace and democracy together.  
Fifth, after a period when their stock in world affairs seemed to be rising, the world’s 
authoritarian regimes may now feel challenged by the MENA’s region’s demonstration that freedom 
and democracy are very widely held aspirations and cannot easily be dismissed as ethnocentric tools 
of western imperialism.Admittedly the immediate reaction of governments ranging from Iran, China 
and Russia to Syria and Bahrain has been to increase repression at home. And in Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf Cooperation Council countries massively increased government spending including salary 
hikes for public officials has blunted (but not completely eliminated) discontent there. These reactions 
do not constitute progress for democracy. But they do highlight the fact that notwithstanding the Arab 
revolution there is still much room in the world for basic democratic gains to be made. And so by 
implication the scope for international democracy support to try to make a difference sooner or later 
looks considerable too. In the MENA region in the short term, then, democracy support may see a 
lifeline where it can aim to show that it has improved its game, while the much bigger picture of 
millions of people still living under (in some places increasingly) oppressive regimes suggests that the 
longer-term democracy case for staging effective democracy support is hardly less valid than before. 
Sixth, what the incredibly rapid spread of political change across North Africa reminds 
everyone is that potentially progressive ‘winds of change’ can disseminate independently of Western 
involvement. At the same time it helps confirm the appealing idea that the returns to an effective 
contribution to furthering democracy in one space can be multiplied where there is a regional effect. 
The democratisation literature already said that living in a good or conversely bad neighbourhood can 
make a difference to democratisation’s prospects in a country. So if the dash for democracy 
especially in Egypt can be supported and proves successful then there are wider possibilities too, 
given Egypt’s influential place at the heart of the Arab world. Conversely, if the harmful fall-out from 
the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya continues to threaten destabilisation in countries such as Mali, with 
whom Libya does not even share a border and which had been something of a beacon for 
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democratisation in Africa before the March 2012 military coup, then the case for saying that 
international democracy support could be useful gains special relevance almost anywhere that 
democracies look fragile and vulnerable to surrounding instabilities. 
Finally, although the purpose of the brave people who went out – and continue to go out –on 
the streets in Tunis, Cairo and so on of course was not to cause international democracy support(ers) 
to reflect critically on their own past shortcomings, this is what has happened; it began very quickly 
and continues to this day. 
The Response of Democracy Support So Far 
Democracy support’s most immediate response to the Arab awakening was to try to decide what to 
do next by groping around for lessons from its own past, especially instances where it claims to have 
had some success, such as in Europe’s post-communist transitions. But those cases and so many of 
the circumstances that were present there are so very different from what exists in the MENA region 
that democracy support soon realised it must veer towards a more ad hoc approach.  
On balance the US response to events in North Africa has been ambivalent, for reasons 
everyone understands. The US response to pro-democratic initiatives has been positive where it has 
judged the situation to be changing inexorably anyway. But in general terms it continues to be 
restrained by a web of enduring security and other interests revolving around oil supplies and access 
to military bases, shared concerns with some Arab states like Saudi about Iran’s regional intentions, 
as well as the US commitment to Israel. The low key US response to the harsh crack-down by the 
authorities in Bahrain together with their Saudi allies to domestic protest is illustrative. At the same 
time the Obama administration has sought to put distance from its predecessor’s approach to 
promoting freedom in the region. It knows that a more assertive US leadership could actually prove 
counterproductive to the cause of advancing democracy in a country like Egypt, where in 2012 for 
instance the US funding of local non-governmental actors provoked a backlash from the 
government.The received wisdom for some years then is that although the US remains a key foreign 
player in the region its desire to see democratic change and its ability to advance that change both 
lack strong credibility. 
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The EU in contrast is presented with an opportunity to show that it can exercise political 
leadership in regard to its own backyard. It moved quite quickly to reinvent some old measures, the 
most high profile being positive conditionality – new promises of ‘more’ (help of various kinds but 
importantly not offers of EU membership, which MENA countries do not currently seek anyway) in 
return for ‘more’ (democratic progress). But for the new conditionality to work there needs to be 
coherent benchmarking of the political terms, and Europe would have to depart from previous 
tendencies to ignore slippage in respect of compliance with its demands The EU is also showing 
greater awareness of the need to broaden and deepen engagement with civil society. But in this area 
the EU is notoriously bureaucratic. The establishment of a new European Endowment for Democracy 
in October 2012 as a joint political project of the EU and its member states is intended to introduce 
greater flexibility in this outreach, but the autonomy it will enjoy in practice and the (probably very 
modest) volume of funds placed at its disposal remain to be seen. In any case Europeans are 
constrained in what they can deliver by overriding political priorities at home, stemming from serious 
financial, economic and social problems. Disagreements within Europe over how to resolve these 
difficulties could spill over into the foreign policy arena. Conversely, preoccupation with reforming the 
EU’s internal political structure - an imperative that has emerged in the wake of the Eurozone crisis - 
might grant the EU’s external relations actors more freedom to develop new initiatives towards near 
neighbours, in the hope that despite internal difficulties the EU can show it is still a force to be 
reckoned with in the world. The US administration seems to expect nothing less. 
Of course the US and EU are not the only international actors in democracy support. Arguably 
United Nations bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)could be taking a 
leading role in the MENA region now. But the region has no guarantee of priority status: only 11 per 
cent of the total of 3014 new funding proposals for the seventh round of the United Nations 
Democracy Fund currently under consideration came from the Arab region, in contrast to almost a 
third from the rest of Africa. 
Some Challenges for Democracy Support in the Region and Beyond 
A challenge can give rise to opportunities, and opportunities themselves can present daunting 
challenges. It is probably much too early to say whether the response that has been made by 
democracy support so far tells us it can rise to the challenges or the opportunities that are presented 
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by events in the MENA region. Similarly it is probably too soon to predict whether it will contribute a 
worthwhile difference there. But that need not prevent us considering why and how events in the 
region speak to both democratisation and democracy support and to relationships between the two. 
Several themes are introduced here, all of them anchored in the belief that democracy support should 
be grounded in a sound understanding of democratisation – of what makes it happen or not happen, 
why it sometimes succeeds and at other times fails or alternatively proceeds very slowly and in a 
nonlinear way. 
Intervene early or later? 
Events so far in the region in part do seem to tell us much that the democratisation literature thought it 
already knew, and what international support should be very aware of, even if the policy implications 
are hard to accept. The banal observation that democratic progress after initial breakthrough is once 
again confirmed to be something that can be both uneven and uncertain, characterised by steps both 
forwards and backwards even within a very short space of time, places democracy support strategy 
on the horns of a dilemma. 
One imperative is to stand back and try to comprehend what is going on before intervening 
prematurely or in ways that would risk harming what should be – and if it is to succeed eventually, 
must be - a largely domestically determined process of change. Being cautious and taking time to 
weigh up what is going on looks especially prudent in this region. As political commentators continue 
to ponder developments there and try to make sense of it all - which means teasing out underlying 
trends from fast changing and often bewildering events on the surface - so democracy support is left 
searching both for good intelligence and clear guidance. The fact that the West’s foreign policy 
towards MENA countries so very recently had misread so badly the political scene, and not foreseen 
where the impetus for change would come from, should be a brake on hubris now. Moreover the 
region’s lack of previous experience in attempting to build democracy, unlike the lessons some ‘third 
wave’ countries in southern Europe, Latin America and Africa who redemocratised in the late 
twentieth century could try to apply from their own previous efforts, urges caution all round too.   
However a very different imperative is to seize the moment and what might turn out to be a 
brief window of opportunity to make a difference, while there is still fluidity and before a measure of 
local path dependence sets in. Forever playing catch up and being seen to be purely reactive have 
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little appeal: if nothing else these render democracy support more vulnerable to critics and their 
budget-cutting propensities at home. The point seems especially true when, as events so far in this 
region and Egypt in particular confirm what the larger literature on democratic transitions already 
says, struggle over process can be crucial. This struggle may be just as contentious or divisive as are 
the more substantive outcomes that the processes themselves help to determine, precisely because 
of the knowledge that process affects outcome. Matters such as power over devising the electoral 
arrangements and the steps by which new constitutional bargains are reached, together with the 
sequencing of these steps with the actual staging of elections, are salient examples here.  
Countering anti-democratic forces without undermining pro-democratic actors 
Events so far have also done little to dispel another expectation borne of standard comparative and 
historical analysis that says popular revolutions – especially those where the driving forces were 
characterised by only loose and informal or ephemeral organisation – can fail to achieve their goals 
where they face threats from either one of two main sources. One of these is the possibility that the 
revolution will be undermined by institutions (like in Egypt’s case the military) or interests (such as 
business interests) associated with the old regime, who may at least try to blunt the changes or their 
impact on where political power lies in the future. The other is the possibility that political change will 
be hijacked by newly liberated forces who use the opportunity to turn the emerging order in a direction 
that may be no more free – or is even less free - than before (political developments in Iran after the 
Shah, for example, although a truly democratic revolution never seemed in prospect there anyway).Of 
course democracy support is already alert to these possibilities not least from its own experience in 
other regions. But it has yet to find surefooted ways of navigating expertly between two main impulses 
that arise in these situations. 
One impulse is an understandable desire to weigh in on the side of domestic actors who 
genuinely want to push democratic reform further forward and might have the potential to do so 
especially if granted greater strength. This would help maintain progress in the face of other actors – 
including doubtful democrats - who would be suspected of wanting to arrest, subvert or turn back 
change.  A different impulse heeds the warnings that are often made against taking sides in an 
emerging political market, where contending forces compete over the pace and shape of change. The 
warnings may point out correctly that too little is known about the actors and their (only limited) ability 
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to put support to good use. And/or there is a real risk that the chosen partners and perhaps even the 
legitimacy of an entire electoral contest will be heavily compromised as a result. After all, democracy 
support has not been well served in the past where the West has been perceived to show less 
commitment to free and fair elections in emerging democracies than to ensuring that its own favoured 
candidates win (the Palestinian legislative election in 2006 is a pertinent example). An extrapolation 
from this would say that democratisation is not well served either. Hardly less perilous in MENA 
countries now would be a scenario where democracy support becomes drawn into inter-party 
competition with the aim of helping ‘moderate’ Islamist parties navigate between the demands of so 
called liberal and secularist opponents on the one side and more radical Islamists such as Salafists 
on the other – a party challenge that is already under way in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. But 
only the citizens and voters of those countries can address this challenge, and they must work it 
through for themselves. There are enough examples of external aid to parties in other regions to 
suggest that if international actors do want to exert an influence then they should adopt more indirect 
routes than partisan involvement,
ii
 for example helping to strengthening election management bodies 
and other ways of supporting the development of  a ‘level playing field’. 
Challenges of development…and party politics 
A further major lesson already apparent from the literature about democratisation in developing 
countries, which seems to be confirmed once again by recent events in the MENA region, is that 
sooner or later most people will expect political breakthrough to bring tangible improvement in their 
material lives. That means things like remunerative employment, personal security and the 
satisfaction of other basic needs. After all, the popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and 
elsewhere have developed against a background of economic discontents combined with widely-held 
grievances over social injustice. The governing elites were seen to be using power to advance their 
own material interests, including by corrupt means. So in terms of modernisation theory, the stimulus 
to democratic change could only be said to have come from modernisation and development if we 
underplay the claim that such processes create a broad middle class eager to progress from 
economistic goods to political goods, and highlight instead how a very uneven distribution of the 
material gains that can accrue from economic liberalisation will provoke strong resentment among 
groups who lose out absolutely or even in relative terms. 
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Events in the MENA region show that economic woes and crises can be more likely than 
prosperity to fuel authoritarian break-down and provide openings to democracy. The fact that Gulf 
states resorted to increase in public spending that included generous benefits for already bloated 
public sector bureaucracies and the fact that they have largely escaped major political upheavals may 
well be connected, although how sustainable in financial terms the response will prove to be remains 
an open question. Once again, however, the point that economic malaise threatens political stability of 
authoritarian regimes is not a social scientific break-through, for this is well established in the broader 
literature
iii
 even if it applies less well to the most severely authoritarian cases, North Korea for 
example.It does help explain for example the paranoia that the Communist Party leaders in China 
appear to show towards slips in that country’s impressive rates of economic growth. And providing 
that China successfully turns to domestic engines of growth in the form of Chinese consumer 
demand,as a counter to failing external markets, it should be able to maintain growth to the point 
where few if any commentators would predict democratic transformation there any time soon. 
But for MENA countries now, there is a separate but no less pessimistic proposition that 
failure to address citizen demands for material improvement and social justice will easily blight the 
prospects for maintaining democratic breakthrough let alone the chances of further progress. This is 
especially so if society holds bad governance responsible for the failings, which is what Diamond 
previously identified as one of the most potent obstacles to democratic advance in newer 
democracies.
iv
  These propositions do not enjoy quite the same status as the venerable finding, first 
popularised by Lipset in 1959
v
 that says where the benefits of economic development are reasonably 
widely distributed, a democracy is more likely to be stable than in the absence of such conditions (this 
does not mean development is a necessary condition for democratic transition,or a sufficient condition 
to make democratisation irreversible). Nevertheless, failure to develop will be hugely problematic for 
politics in the region. Even resource rich Libya may not be exempt from concern, for the record of oil 
and gas rentier states apart from well-established democracies like Norway has been consistently 
unfavourable to democratisation (by comparison Indonesia’s democratic progress since the 1990s 
could be benefitting from that country’s decreasing dependence on oil and gas revenues).For some 
countries, then, increase in international development support may be necessary but is far from being 
a sufficient condition. Indeed, if political instability or worse - violent civil conflict - persist in MENA 
countries then the chances of making sound economic progressthere must be poor. This would seem 
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to make democracy support look that much more essential even if incapable of achieving a great deal 
on its own, regardless of whether plural party politics takes root and becomes institutionalised soon. 
Party politics is revisited here because a less jaundiced perspective on economic 
disappointment in the coming years is that the trend could provide a useful segueway to the kind of 
competitive party system that ultimately will be good for democracy, in particular for making 
governments democratically accountable. The argument is that the Islamist parties who currently 
enjoy more electoral support than secular parties will lose popularity if they prove incapable of 
delivering on promises to improve the lives of ordinary people. However, different outcomes to this 
look possible too. One alternative that commentators are increasingly predicting could happen in 
South Africa is that once the African National Congress faces a strong chance of losing power at the 
ballot box it will prevent that happening by progressively dismantling freedoms and democracy. What 
Huntington called the double turnover test for democratic consolidation is never reached if the rule of 
law is dismantled in this way.
vi
 
The South African example however is not strictly comparable. For in South Africa and 
elsewhere in the southern African region the potential threat to democracy that today’s one-party 
dominance is believed to pose owes in part to the dominant party’s unique claim to political 
legitimacy. This comes from its connection with the forces that brought national liberation from 
colonial or white rule. This claim is not available to the Islamist parties that seem most popular in 
North Africa right now, for it was other social groups who were in the front line at the outset of the 
recent revolutions. Of course these parties may still choose to try to hold on to power at almost any 
cost. No less worrying, however, would be a situation where more ‘extreme’ (more anti-democratic) 
political parties are able to capitalise on the situation, or if the armed forces see a justification for 
staging a military coup. Situations like these are easy to speculate because examples can be found 
from other regions, including where populist politicians are the ones to gain in the short term and then 
develop autocratic or even demagogic tendencies, with negative consequences for liberal democracy 
later (arguably Venezuela under President Chávez was an example). If it is to be ready to offer a 
relevant response then international democracy support must first determine where it stands on 
whether, how and to what extent its own idea(s) of democracy can incorporate or be accommodated 
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to local variants of democracy, including especially various shades of Islam and associated political 
beliefs. 
Contested ideas of democracy 
Recent scholarly interest in democracy support has supplied a distinctive critical theory approach to 
the idea(s) of democracy that support should concern itself with. Kurki and others argue that non-
liberal theories of democracy – which above all means theories that are not wedded to neo—liberal 
economics – should be given a fair hearing by democracy support actors as well as in literature about 
their activity.
vii
 As to what these theories are, their compatibility with liberal democracy and the extent 
to which they are truly democratic are all questions that merit more extended discussion. The 
substantive policy implications that would follow for democracy support are at an even more 
exploratory stage,with the exception of some obvious conclusions about what democracy support 
should not do or should cease doing, such as impose neo-liberal economic solutions. 
The democracy support industry’s willingness to offer support to the establishment of 
alternatives to familiar western style democracy especially any that reject the market economy even 
when rigorously regulated is debateable. Its preparedness to proactively encourage real alternatives 
is even more doubtful. Furthermore, there is far from compelling evidence that radically different and 
coherent ideas of political economy and a credible strategy for executing them are high on the agenda 
of the ruling elites in MENA countries today, even if some commentators in the West wish the 
situation was different. And while on the one hand there are claims that at least some European 
democracy support is very comfortable with social democratic ideas and measures, on the other hand 
the freedom to make policy enjoyed by many MENA region governments is heavily constrained by 
their own financial weakness and structural forces in the global financial and economic system. These 
forces are vastly more powerful than any influence that the democracy support industry might exert 
independently by seeming to acquiesce in dominant liberal economic ideas. Of course this state of 
affairs may well prove to be hugely problematic for the countries’ rulers going forward. This is 
especially so if it is neo-liberal economic policies themselves, rather than the way the governments 
have applied and implemented them in the past that contributed so greatly to the bad social 
consequences and the ensuing popular protest that unseated the old regimes. 
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Be that as it may, there are other areas of ideological contestation that look no less – and 
possibly even more - pertinent, the most notable being in regard to political Islam. The issue here is 
very much about ideas of democracy, not about whether democracy can thrive in a market economy, 
and not the now outmoded belief associated with some of Huntington’s writings that certain cultures 
including those permeated by Islamic, Confucian and even Catholic religious beliefs are inhospitable 
conditions for sustained democratisation.
viii
 Nevertheless international democracy support does now 
have to ask itself whether the idea of democracy with Islamist characteristics is coherent and 
meaningful, and, if the answer is yes, where the conceptual boundaries lie. Of course it is not only 
democracy support that must think this through. Philosophers and religious scholars have ruminated 
on this for many years. But the fact that Islam can be seen as a broad church makes it both easier to 
contemplate the possibility of combining aspects of political Islam with democracy, and also more 
difficult to establish exactly where to draw the line.  The guidance that democracy support might hope 
to find from the more theoretical discourse is not entirely clear cut, even as democracy support itself 
must now confront these issues full on probably for the very first time.  
The democratising experience of Turkey, which in recent years has benefitted from strong 
economic performance and external prodding by the EU on human rights, and Indonesia’s democratic 
progress, are two important cases that may be read as showing the compatibility of Islamism and 
democracy. But to all intents and purposes they resemble secular states (although Indonesia’s 
constitution differs from Turkey in requiring faith in one of several religions).This presents a contrast 
with what seems likely to emerge in the Arab countries. Furthermore international democracy 
assistance has not had a substantial on-the-ground presence in either Turkey or Indonesia. Turkey is 
indeed now talked about in some quarters as a democratic role model for majority Islamic societies. 
But there are crucial differences between Turkey’s political evolution to date and that of Arab 
countries. Furthermore, and perhaps because Turkey is being talked about as a model, Turkey’s own 
liberal democratic shortcomings at the present time including major infringements of press freedom 
attract growing criticism in the West. So, taking a position on whether and how to reconcile notions 
that the people are sovereign and all citizens are formally equal (which lie at the heart of democracy 
as it has been understood in the West) on the one hand, with approaches to institutionalising Sharia 
law in some way and recognising differential rights for groups according to sex, religion, sect or 
ethnicity, on the other hand, will be a severe test for the democracy support industry. The familiar 
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mantra heard from democracy’s international supporters that says societies must make their own 
democratic choices about the shape of democracy, because no one size or single model of 
democracy can fit all, sharpens the dilemma. Neither democracy promotion’s clearest successes so 
far – which arguably lie among European countries that transited from Communist Party rule - nor the 
failures (in Europe and elsewhere) have helped prepare it to address this conundrum. Of course if the 
MENA countries now move back towards irrefutably authoritarian and illiberal or undemocratic rule 
then the imperative to address questions about how and how far political Islam and democracy are 
compatible, and what support should be given for building democracy, will seem less urgent. But from 
a democratisation perspective this would not be a prospect to be welcomed. 
Institutional matters 
Struggles over democracy’s future in the MENA region will make it more difficult to hide from the 
under-representation of gender issues relative to other issues in democracy support, in 
democratisation and in the relevant literatures. For signs are already present that women face 
discrimination in the shaping and the substance of the new political order notwithstanding their 
significant role as activists during the Arab spring. Late changes to the wording of Egypt’s December 
2012 constitution and protests by women in Tunisia, who compared to other Arab countries have 
more to lose than men from the transformation of the previous regime, are some of the evidence. But 
if getting the institutional architecture right is one - albeit not sufficient  - approach to securing greater 
female emancipation and empowerment then making the executive more accountable, in a part of the 
world where historically the legislature, judiciary and (opposition) parties have all been extremely 
weak, must also be high on every democrat’s agenda. Here the democracy support actors can at 
least aim to provide opportunities for comparative politics specialists in institutional design to engage 
both with themselves and of course political actors in the region. 
Of course governments must have some ability to deliver on what society wants from 
government - and on the promises that politicians make when they seek public office - if accountability 
is to have meaning and the electorate’s opportunity to make choices at the ballot box are to have 
value.  But experience from many places shows that strengthening the ability of governments to do 
precisely that often have to be accompanied by efforts to ensure they will do that. Recent research on 
black Africa claims that democracy aid has indeed supported democratic transitions there.
ix
 But the 
16 
 
long record of international development aid including some of its more recent interest in reforming 
governance also indicates that by enhancing the government’s executive capabilities such aid can 
work against making government more democratically accountable.
x
To exert a countervailing force, 
by keeping democratic objectives as well as the more development-oriented improvements in 
governance firmly in view, should fall foursquare within democracy support’s own terms of reference. 
In regard to legislative strengthening, some agencies of international development 
cooperation have recently shown increased interest in providing support for this aim, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa. And in respect to the development of competitive political party systems, this 
means supporting the efforts of local actors to reach consensus on how the electoral game should be 
played, and devising or constructing institutions that will ensure the playing field stays reasonably 
even. This is essential if the emergence of what Levitsky and Way call competitive authoritarianism is 
to be avoided.
xi
 The importance of support for the institutionalisation of an enabling environment for 
competitive politics between elections, rather than simply at the time when elections are held, is an 
important finding of much of the work that has been done on international election observation and 
monitoring.
xii
 This resonates with for example Egypt’s experience of elections in years ahead of the 
Arab spring.  Similar findings apply to party support too, where a long-term approach to building a 
competitive party system requires much more than offering direct support to parties individually, 
where financial support specifically can arouse suspicions of improper foreign interference even when 
not banned outright by law. Beyond political parties and legislatures, yet another sector where broadly 
based research suggests strong performance can play a crucial role in preventing democratic 
backsliding is a flourishing press and other independent media.
xiii
 This means that international 
support ranging from technical assistance to diplomatic interventions on behalf of journalists who 
would otherwise face harassment or persecution may be appropriate. At the same time it must now 
take account of the dramatically increased potential of social media to assist social mobilisation for 
democratic causes, and the techniques governments use to control electronic communication for anti-
democratic purposes, if it wants to make an impact in the future. 
Finally, getting civil-military relations right is one more component of the architecture of 
democracy that needs to be addressed, and is more pressing in the MENA region than has been true 
of some other countries that entered transition to democracy in the last twenty years or so.After all, 
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the position the armed forces took proved crucial to the way events played out in the region once 
popular protests started to gain momentum, as a comparison of Tunisia and Egypt, where the military 
declined to prop up the old rulers at any cost, with Libya and Syria illustrates well. In future a 
staggered draw-down of military privileges, as in Chile in the years following the Pinochet dictatorship, 
might be one option. Another option is allowing the armed forces to keep financial assets and 
business interests they accumulated in the past and even to continue to profit from government arms 
purchases, in return for bowing out of politics. This appears to have served the stability of Indonesia’s 
new democracy. 
Introducing democracy amid violence 
The persistence of politically motivated violence in countries including Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria 
reminds us that in contrast to the West’s past encouragement to democratise and support for security 
sector reform in this region (and elsewhere), which proceeded along two separate tracks, now more 
holistic thinking and joined-up practice are needed more than ever. Formerly, security sector 
initiatives that reflected the West’s interest in maintaining political stability for the purpose of 
combatting international terrorism, controlling migrant labour flows and so on could be accused of 
undermining the prospects for transition to democracy there. The contradictions seemed to be ignored 
at the time. Analysts studying international security and political scientists studying either 
democratisation or democracy support did not engage in a seamless discourse. Practical 
collaboration among practitioners on the ground was not much in evidence either. 
However, given that political change has begun in the MENA region, and the West’s worst 
nightmares about turmoil and even the possibility that one or more states might start to fail begin to 
look less incredible, the goal of making security sector reform work for the benefit of building 
democracy (and vice versa) looks both sensible and essential. The rationale for doing so applies at 
least up to the point where new democracies start to deliver real benefits to society – creating multiple 
stakeholders in both peace and democracy at the same time. Once again there is an assumption 
being made here that reversion to something like the political status quo ante would not be an 
attractive alternative, if only because it could promise no guarantees of political stability let alone 
freedom or democracy. But as stability remains a prime concern still, so making a success of 
democracy-building now becomes a security priority for the West. Some of the more practical political 
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challenges are already flagged up in the literature. For example Gillies presents arguments supported 
by strong evidence from several cases urge against staging elections in so-called post-conflict 
situations prematurely.
xiv
 The chances of provoking yet more or renewed violence, diminishing 
political legitimacy and preventing stable governance will be worth considering in the context of Syria 
at some point in the future, even if the lessons come too late for some other countries such as Iraq. 
But social science too faces challenges in coming to terms with the necessary degree of inter(not 
multi)-disciplinarity if the lacunae between security and foreign policy studies on one side and 
democratisation and democracy support studies on the other are to be bridged. 
Aside from elections, developing institutions for exacting proper legal accountability and 
effective civilian oversight of the military, para-military, police and other security services is no less 
important than helping weak or fractured states (re)gain something close to a monopoly of the means 
of physical violence across the full length and breadth of their country. Indeed, the environment 
presented by such states is precisely one where international help with developing these institutions 
could both be essential and feasible too. This may well be true even at times when no one can be 
sure what the political complexion of the emerging civil power will look like or how far it is truly 
committed to all the freedoms normally associated with core democratic values. Everywhere, the 
larger point stands: the presence of viable state institutions is generally regarded as a sine qua non 
for democracy-building and so for any democracy-supporting agenda. Experience in the MENA region 
turns the analysis then in the direction of what the democratisation literature calls the sequencing 
debate. Efforts to establish the rule of law and construct regularising grounded institutions for the 
societal expression of interests and demands must accompany such democratic advances as those 
which invite contestation and promote popular participation. 
Final remarks 
Three sets of overarching conclusions are offered here: first, about the region; second, about 
democratisation studies; and third about the guidance these can offer to democracy support in the 
region and beyond. 
First, while recent developments in the MENA region have served to underscore some things 
about democratisation that analysts thought they already knew, it is not obvious that we understand 
enough to foresee with confidence the way things will turn out. The exceptions are rather sweeping 
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judgments, like the future for the most part remains uncertain; and the paths or pace of political 
change will probably vary from one country to another because of differences in their political history 
and other conditions. So, no singular model of Arab democracy and no one pattern of Arab 
democratisation, even though distinctively Islamic versions look more of a possibility. 
Furthermore there is little new to be gained by arguing that recent events in the region have 
shattered the belief that autocratic downfalls are impossible, or the belief that when they do occur, 
progression to democracy is inevitable or linear and smooth. The many political twists and turns that 
have been witnessed around the world during the last two decades, and the large democratisation 
literature that has been spawned, are enough for such naïve beliefs – if or where they existed - to be 
seen for what they are, namely straw persons. 
The genesis of the situations now facing North African countries does look rather special, that 
is to say not military overthrow of the former regime by external force (as in Iraq, although Libya is a 
partial exception); and not the emergence of terminal fissions in the old ruling group (these began to 
appearonly after a momentum for change began to build from below); and not a gradual morphing of 
political liberalisation into democratisation during which key members of the former regime control the 
manner and direction of change. The last approach might eventually bring about something like 
constitutional monarchy in Morocco and Jordan, but there are few signs yet that the monarchs are 
willing to abandon personal rule. However the origins of the MENA region’s revolutions that can be 
traced to widespread social and economic discontents and to grievances about self-serving rule 
certainly are not unique; much of black Africa’s second ‘wind of change’ in the 1990s was built on 
similar foundations. Africa’s steps forward in democratisation since then may look greater than the 
reversals
xv
, which feeds hope for MENA countries. But there is still a long way to go. And without 
improvements to socio-economic rights and the physical security of citizens, Africa’s political gains 
are judged both fragile and incomplete.
xvi
This too is a relevant pointer to MENA’s future. 
In MENA countries ordinary people decided it was time to say enough is enough. They 
reacted to a steady accumulation of resentments in a way that could have been predicted, although 
failure to anticipate the speed with which a boldness to protest overcame fear and spread across 
borders is easier to understand. In countries like Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine in contrast the spark 
that was responsible for regime replacement was different, in so far as a blatantly fraudulent election 
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is what seemed to trigger the protest from below. Also, the potential cost to the individual from taking 
protest to the streets there was smaller, especially compared to Libya and Syria where the regime’s 
response was so brutal. Across the MENA region the conduct of the armed forces has been – 
continues to be - a determining influence on the course of events. This brings back into focus an actor 
that was almost lost sight of in much of the democratisation discourse as it moved on from its early 
origins debating the democratic transitions in Latin America’s southern cone. The belief that semi-
liberalised authoritarian rule can persist almost indefinitely has certainly taken a knock. And different 
kinds of regime now exist from those which were there before in MENA. But fragility and high fluidity 
remain. 
A second overarching conclusion is that on the limited evidence the region supplies so far, 
there is no reason to doubt the conventional wisdom that democracy’s progress after initial break-
through is contingent on interaction among a plurality of interconnecting variables. These include 
institutional choices, political cultural factors, social forces and economic circumstances, together with 
influences from outside and among which international democracy support is probably just a minor 
part. Developing even more fine-grained theories that distinguish between alternative scenarios like 
openings to democracy (and the influences upon that), democratic transition (and the influences), 
democratic consolidation (and the influences) and – just as important - reversals in respect of each 
and every one of these scenarios, remains a worthy endeavour in the light of MENA experience. But 
as of now, such theory construction may offer only limited purchase for would-be providers of 
democracy support. For only after the event and with the benefit of hindsight will we know for sure 
which of these alternatives most accurately describes the developments that have been taking place 
on the ground. And even then we might never understand fully the immediate causes and the timing 
of what began as spontaneous popular events.
xvii
Once clear political trends start to become more 
embedded, then it should be possible for comparative political analysis to generate greater insights 
that democracy support might put to some use. But by then the most optimal time for influencing the 
course of events may have passed. 
Third and notwithstanding the above, international support for democracy can see itself as 
being in a better place than it was immediately before the Arab awakenings. The revolutions provided 
grounds for critical self-reflection: albeit the fruits so far may not look very impressive and the task 
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remains work in progress. But the situation found in the countries where some kind of opening to 
democracy has been attempted provides a much stronger case for democracy support to be involved 
now than if the Arab transformations had already failed and were reverting back to authoritarian rule 
or, conversely, are now proceeding smoothly and swiftly towards stable well-regarded democracy. 
The logic of this argument still applies even if one conclusion drawn from the Arab spring is that it tells 
us democracy support can make little contribution to bringing down authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
rulers, such as those in Iran, the Persian/Arabian Gulf and further afield. So further deliberation now 
should dwell on how to support the MENA countries where change is taking place, and help them 
maintain or re-install a democratic direction during these testing times when political struggles 
between contending forces are far from over. 
Needless to say international support must be on an invitation basis and take forms that are 
acceptable to partners on both sides – conditions that are quite restrictive such as in respect of the 
foreign funding of political parties and civil society organisations in Egypt in particular.  And relations 
with the larger and broader foreign policy initiatives of actors outside the region have to be supportive 
as well. For example, the EU’s repeated rebuffing of Turkey’s aspirations to gain full EU membership 
not only reduces the EU’s ability to encourage Turkey to embrace democratic norms and freedoms 
more fully, but also risks signalling to MENA countries a low confidence in the compatibility of 
democracy and Islam. Europe denies itself opportunities to use Turkey’s growing influence as a force 
for democracy in MENA countries. The political reshaping of the European Union that is under way as 
a result of sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone could see the emergence of two rings of members - 
an inner ring more closely integrated politically than now and an outer ring including the UK (with or 
without Scotland if Scotland votes for independence and seeks a different relationship with the EU) 
that is much looser politically. Historic opportunity moments such as these that could revive the 
possibility of Turkish accession – if appropriate only to the second of these rings, in the first instance – 
could have multiple benefits for international democracy support in the larger Middle East region. In 
so far as the future fortunes of Europe’s flagging economy benefitted there would be a windfall gain 
too. 
The evidence from the global picture of attempted democratisation from the 1970s onwards 
tells us that liberal democracy’s chances of being firmly institutionalised in the space of a few years 
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are not high. The local context in the MENA countries and the course of events since 2010 do little to 
suggest that the odds in this region are any more favourable. But none of this means democracy in 
the world has made no progress, or that compared to several decades ago there are not now more 
freedoms in several countries whose regimes are not as (liberal) democratic as democracy supporters 
in the West would wish. So long as there are pro-democratic voices in the MENA region who are 
themselves in a better place than they were before 2010, it will be hard to conclude that international 
democracy support has no future relevance there or anywhere else in the world. The key questions 
then will revolve not around whether but instead around who are the most appropriate actors on either 
side, how to express support and for what. Identifying pro-democratic social forces outside the more 
traditional modal patterns of civil society or party engagement and the kind of partnerships that will 
work for the purpose of building new democracies is one area where research could now concentrate. 
Determining how imaginative the West can be and wants to be in its ideas of democracy suggests 
another area where democratisation studies and democracy support studies both separately and 
together could engage in more new thinking. 
In conclusion, recent developments in the MENA region both present challenges that should 
be viewed as opportunities, and offer opportunities that will be challenging to address, not just for 
democracy support in the region and further afield but in terms of the guidance that democratisation 
studies have to offer.  
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